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Abstract
According to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electro-
dynamics, the electromagnetic field is conceived as a real physical entity
existing in space and time. The problem we address in this paper is how
to understand this spatiotemporal existence, that is, how to describe the
persistence of a field-like physical entity like electromagnetic field.
First, we provide a formal description of the notion of persistence: we
derive an “equation of persistence” constituting a necessary condition that
the spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of a persist-
ing physical entity must satisfy. We then prove a theorem according to
which the vast majority of the solutions of Maxwell’s equations, describ-
ing possible spatiotemporal distributions of the fundamental attributes of
the electromagnetic field, violate the equation of persistence. Finally, we
discuss the consequences of this result for the ontology of the electromag-
netic field.
1 Introduction
There is a long debate in contemporary metaphysics whether and in what sense
instantaneous velocity can be regarded as an intrinsic property of an object at
a given moment of time (Butterfield 2006; Hawley 2001, pp. 76–80; Sider 2001,
pp. 34–35; Arntzenius 2000; Tooley 1988). What is important from this debate
to our present concern is—in which there seems to be a consensus—that
[T]he notion of velocity presupposes the persistence of the object
concerned. For average velocity is a quotient, whose numerator
must be the distance traversed by the given persisting object [. . .]
So presumably, average velocity’s limit, instantaneous velocity, also
presupposes persistence. (Butterfield 2005, p. 257).
We will argue in this paper that the opposite is also true: persistence presupposes
velocity. More precisely, as we will see, in case of a spatially extended physical
object, persistence presupposes, at least, the existence of a field of local and
instantaneous velocity; regardless if this local instantaneous velocity is consid-
ered as an intrinsic property of the object concerned, or not. Velocity occurs as
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a “kinematic” feature of the way in which the object persists. This is in accor-
dance with our natural intuition: if a material object like a small particle exists,
it exists in space and time; if it persists, it must occur somewhere in space at
different moments of time. So it must have some (not necessarily non-zero)
average velocity characterizing its spatiotemporal existence.
In section 2 we give a formal description of persistence in terms of the spa-
tiotemporal distributions of quantities that track the identity of the persisting
object through time. We derive an “equation of persistence” constituting a nec-
essary condition the distributions of tracking quantities must satisfy in every
space-time point where the extended object persists. It turns out however that
this condition is not necessarily satisfied by some field-like physical entities.
In section 3 we discuss the case of electromagnetic field. We show that the
equation of persistence is satisfied in some particular states of the electromag-
netic field. This is however the exception: we will prove a theorem according
to which the vast majority of the solutions of Maxwell’s equations violate the
equation of persistence. In section 4 we discuss the possible consequences con-
cerning the ontology of electromagnetic field.
2 Formal description of persistence
Physics literature has practically no explicit discussion of the problem of per-
sistence. There must be however an implicit intuition of persistence behind
such everyday notions of physics as the velocity of a moving object, the world
line or world tube of a material body, the lifetime of a particle, the track of a
particle in a cloud chamber, the speed of a neutrino, the deformation of a rod,
the cooling of a hot iron ball, etc. If these notions make sense at all – without
which there would be no meaningful physical theory – there must be a sense
of persistence; some criteria, some facts of the physical world, that entitle the
physicist to say that the substance occupying region A at moment t and the one
occupying region A∗ at t∗ constitute the same physical object. Claims of this
sort, in which we assert that an object existing at one time is the same object as
the one existing at some other time, are called claims of diachronic sameness.
Metaphysicians offer two major interpretations of persistence: endurantism
and perdurantism. According to endurantism a concrete particular persists
through time by existing wholly and completely at each moment of time of
its existence. In other words, persistence through time is construed as the nu-
merical identity of a thing existing at one time with a thing existing at another
time. As opposed to endurantism, according to perdurantism assertions of di-
achronic sameness are not assertions of literal identity at all; a concrete partic-
ular is constituted by a sequence of numerically different temporal parts (phases,
stages, or temporal slices). Endurantism is usually combined with presentism
or three dimensionalism, while perdurantism with eternalism or four dimen-
sionalism.
Although it is not at all obvious what the final ontology of the world is ac-
cording to our best physical theories (e.g. Kuhlmann 2015), it is not far from
the truth to say that the world view of contemporary physics is closer to per-
durantism + four dimensionalism.
Perdurantism + four dimensionalism (also called “worm-view”) has to
explain how temporal “parts”, as independent entities, constitute a four-
Figure 1: Which head belongs to which tail? Entity A is obviously not similar to
entity D in all respects; as A is a head and D is a tail, for example. But the fact that
A belongs to the same caterpillar as D entails that some intrinsic properties of A and
D are common; for example, the cells in A and D have the same genome. What is true
about the spatial parts is true about the temporal parts. The fact that caterpillar AD is
the same being as butterfly F entails that they have the same genome.
dimensional “whole”. In other words: what makes the “temporal parts” parts
of one and the same four-dimensional object? The dominant views are based
on three components: spatiotemporal continuity, qualitative similarity, and
causal relations. The crucial question is how qualitative similarity should be
understood. Qualitative identity, the maximal level of qualitative similarity,
can be too strong a requirement for diachronic sameness; arbitrary kind and
level of qualitative similarity can be too weak. Further restrictions to qualita-
tive similarity might be needed (e.g. Swartz 1991, pp. 337–357).
It is not our intention, however, to give a general criterion sufficient for di-
achronic sameness. For our present purposes we only need to assume that, in
every particular case, there is some level of qualitative similarity that is neces-
sary for diachronic sameness. To make explicit what we mean by the “necessary
level of qualitative similarity”, we stipulate the following.
Tracking principle If two things in region A at moment t and in region A∗ at
t∗ are the same physical object, then there is a certain package of tracking properties
intrinsic to both things, in region A at time t and in region A∗ at time t∗.
That is to say, diachronic sameness is tracked by sameness in some key prop-
erties. This claim quadrates with the wider metaphysical view that qualitative
similarity should be understood as “partial identity” (e.g. Heil 2003, p. 156).
Literally speaking, the tracking principle, as a necessary condition for di-
achronic sameness, is also compatible with endurantism. It simply follows
from the Leibniz principle: if two things in two different spatiotemporal re-
gions are numerically identical, then, by the indiscernibility of identicals, they
must have all properties in common; a fortiori, they must share some of their
properties. (It is not our concern here to discuss the tension between diachronic
identity, the Leibniz principle, and change in time.)
First of all, however, the tracking principle can be learned from the prac-
tice of physics. For when the physicist asserts that the particle emitted here is
the same particle as the one detected over there, what she asserts is the exis-
tence of some key properties—the particle’s mass, charge, spin, lepton number,
etc.—instantiated both at the events of emission and detection. (Consider the
analogy depicted in Fig. 1.) When the physicist talks about velocity, world
line, lifetime, deformation, etc.—notions that presuppose the persistence of a
physical object—, there always exists a package of key intrinsic properties char-
acterizing the object in question in terms of which the physicist can express its
diachronic sameness. In fact, from a physics point of view, each particular ap-
plication of the tracking principle can be conceived as a part of the constitutive
a priori1 that provides the very meaning of a physical term like velocity, world
line, lifetime, deformation, etc. Again, it must be emphasized that the tracking
principle, even when conceived as a constitutive principle for physics, is only
supposed to specify a necessary condition for identity through time, but not a
sufficient one. Two electrons have the same intrinsic properties, but in many
cases the physicist is able to discern them based on other considerations like
spatiotemporal continuity.
From metaphysical point of view, the difference between necessity and suf-
ficiency is even more fundamental. Imagine a particle moving along a path.
Assume that the particle is annihilated at a moment of time; and, immediately,
another particle is created with exactly the same intrinsic properties, continuing
along the same path. (‘Another’ means ‘numerically distinct’ for the enduran-
tist, and ‘belonging to a different worm’ for the perdurantist.) As this example
shows, even if spatiotemporal continuity is provided, and even if the pack-
age of tracking properties covers all intrinsic properties (qualitative identity),
the tracking condition does not constitute a sufficient metaphysical criterion of
diachronic sameness.
Note also that the principle says nothing about the content of the package
of tracking properties in question. In particular, it is not necessarily identical
with the complete package of properties determining the synchronic identity
of the object; neither in the sense of a four-dimensional worm, nor in the sense
of its temporal parts in region A at time t or in region A∗ at time t∗. Further,
the existence of such a package does not imply that the object cannot change in
time: it can change in all the various properties not contained in the tracking
package. (Consider again the analogy depicted in Fig. 1.)
In what follows we shall translate the condition provided by the tracking
principle to mathematical terms. Without loss of generality we may assume
that each of the tracking properties in question can be characterized as such
that a certain (real valued) quantity fi takes a certain value; more precisely, the
spatiotemporal distribution of this quantity, fi(r, t), takes a certain local value
at a spatiotemporal locus. Accordingly, we are going to express a necessary
1In the sense of Reichenbach 1965.
the world line along which the ball
persists (endures/perdures)
Figure 2: A small, “point-like” ball can be tracked by its spottednes, rubberness, etc.
condition for diachronic sameness in terms of these distributions of tracking
quantities. We proceed in three heuristic steps.
I.
First we consider the persistence of a point-like physical object.
Let f1, f2, ..., fn be the package of tracking quantities. In line with the track-
ing principle we assume that
fi(r, t) = fi(r∗, t∗) (1)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
for any two points (r, t) and (r∗, t∗) along the world-line of the persisting object
(Fig. 2). Introducing the average velocity as v = r
∗−r
t∗−t , we can write:
fi(r, t) = fi(r+ vδt, t + δt) (2)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
with δt = t∗ − t.
Assume that all functions f1, f2, ..., fn are smooth (if not, they can be approx-
imated as closely as required for physics by smooth functions). Taking (2) for a
small, infinitesimal interval of time, and expressing it in a differential form—by
which, moreover, we comply with the required spatiotemporal continuity—we
have
−∂t fi(r, t) = ∇ fi(r, t) · v(t) (3)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
where v(t) is the instantaneous velocity. In components:
−∂t fi(r, t) = Vx∂x fi(r, t) + Vy∂y fi(r, t) + Vz∂z fi(r, t) (4)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Of course, the concrete world-line along which the object persists may be var-
ied. Thus, equations (3) with some instantaneous velocity constitute a necessary
condition the tracking quantities must satisfy in every space-time point where
the object persists. Let us call them the equations of point-like persistence.
the world tube in which the ball
persists (endures/perdures)
Figure 3: A spotted ball, as an extended object, can be characterized by the distribu-
tions of whiteness and blackness
II.
Now we make a straightforward extension of the above results to the case
of a spatially extended object. Assume that the fine-grained structure of an
extended object also can be described in terms of the distributions of some,
probably more fundamental, quantities (Fig. 3). And, therefore, the diachronic
sameness of the persisting object can be tracked in terms of a suitable pack-
age of these distributions, f1, f2, ..., fn. It is a straightforward generalization
of the idea expressed in equation (3) to say that if an extended object persists
then there must exist a velocity vector v(t) for every moment of time, such that
equation (3) is satisfied in all space-time points (r, t) belonging to the space-
time tube swept by the extended object.
However, this describes only a particular situation when the extended ob-
ject persists like a rigid body in translational motion. The instantaneous ve-
locity v(t) is the same everywhere in the spatial region occupied by the object.
Consequently, the spatial distributions fi(r, t = const) are simply translating
with a universal velocity, without deformation. Of course, generally this is not
necessarily the case. For example, the ball in Fig. 4 preserves its identity even
though it rotates and inflates.
III.
Concerning the general case, imagine an extended object with a more complex
behavior. Let Σt and Σt+δt denote the spatial regions occupied by the object at
time t and t + δt. The object can change in various senses. Even if Σt = Σt+δt,
the spatial distributions of its local properties may change, in the sense that for
several distributions fi(r, t) 6≡ fi(r, t + δt). Moreover, Σt and Σt+δt may differ
not only in their location but also in size and shape. All these changes manifest
themselves in the spatiotemporal distributions of local properties, that is, in
the distributions fi(r, t). For example, all changes, the translation, the rotation,
and the inflation of the ball in Fig. 4 are expressible in terms of the distributions
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the world "tube" in which the ball
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Figure 4: The ball preserves its identity even though it may rotate or inflate
like whiteness(r, t) and blackness(r, t).
Now, how can we describe the persistence of such an object? What con-
ditions the distributions fi(r, t) must satisfy in order to count the two things
in Σt and Σt+δt as identical, or as two temporal parts of the same object? In
line with the tracking principle, the conditions we are looking for have to ex-
press, in terms of a relation between the values of fi(r, t) in Σt and the values
of fi(r, t + δt) in Σt+δt, that Σt and Σt+δt share some key properties. On the
basis of our previous considerations in points I or II and the examples like
the inflating-rotating ball, we claim that the general form of such conditions is
the following. There must exist a package of relevant, tracking distributions
f1, f2, ..., fn and a mapping ϕt,t+δt : Σt → Σt+δt, such that
fi(r, t) = fi(ϕt,t+δt (r) , t + δt) (5)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
(5) expresses the metaphysical intuition that the extended object can be con-
ceived as the mereological sum of its “local parts”, each of which itself being
a persisting entity, whose identity over time is described by function ϕt,t+δt.
Notice that the only non-trivial requirement imposed on ϕt,t+δt by (5) is that
it must be common for all tracking distributions fi(r, t). Intuitively this means
that if a local part of the object at r instantiates some local tracking properties
then its counterpart at point ϕt,t+δt(r) instantiates the same local tracking prop-
erties—in harmony with the tracking principle’s requirement. Note however
that this fact by no means implies that the extended object necessarily consists
of atomic entities—pointlike or non-pointlike—persisting in the sense of points
I or II. Just the contrary, the general notion of persistence defined by (5) satis-
fies a kind of downward mereological principle: if the whole extended object
persists in the sense of (5) then all (arbitrarily small) local parts of the object
persist in the same sense.
Assuming that ϕt,t+δt(r) is smooth and ϕt,t = idΣt —by which we, again,
comply with spatiotemporal continuity—, one can express (5) in the following
differential form:
−∂t fi(r, t) = ∇ fi(r, t) · v(r, t) (6)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
where v(r, t) = ∂t∗ϕt,t∗
∣∣∣∣
t∗=t
(r). v(r, t) can be interpreted as the instantaneous
velocity field characterizing the motion of the local part of the extended entity
at the spatiotemporal locus (r, t).
Taking into account that the concrete mapping ϕt,t+δt : Σt → Σt+δt may
be varied, equations (6) with some suitable instantaneous velocity field v(r, t)
constitute a necessary condition the distributions of tracking quantities must
satisfy in every space-time point where the extended object persists. Let us call
them the equations of persistence.2
3 Covariance
To get closer to real physical examples, we bring a new perspective. Without
serious loss of generality we assume that not only the spatiotemporal quan-
tities, r, t, but all other physical quantities, including the tracking quantities
f1, f2, ..., fn are defined relative to a given inertial frame of reference K.3 Let
K′ be another inertial frame of reference. All physical quantities ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξm
in K have a counterpart in K′, denoted by ξ ′1, ξ
′
2, . . . ξ
′
m respectively. Let Λ
denote the transformation law, that is a one-to-one map from the space of
quantities (ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξm) to the space of quantities
(
ξ ′1, ξ
′
2, . . . ξ
′
m
)
, interconnect-
ing the physically equivalent points in the two spaces. (Lorentz transforma-
tion is a typical example.) That is to say, the values of ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξm—all to-
gether—uniquely determine the values of ξ ′1, ξ
′
2, . . . ξ
′
m, and vice versa.
Consider a subset of physical quantities
{
ξs1 , ξs2 , . . . ξsk
} ⊂ {ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξm}.
We will say that
{
ξs1 , ξs2 , . . . ξsk
}
is closed against the transformation law, if Λ
generates a one-to-one map between the space of
(
ξs1 , ξs2 , . . . ξsk
)
and the space
of
(
ξ ′s1 , ξ
′
s2 , . . . ξ
′
sk
)
; that is, the values of ξs1 , ξs2 , . . . ξsk uniquely determine the
values of ξ ′s1 , ξ
′
s2 , . . . ξ
′
sk , and vice versa.
4
2In a mathematical sense the equation of persistence (6) is of the same form as a continuity
equation without source and conductive current densities,
∂t fi(r, t) +∇ ( fi(r, t)v(r, t)) = 0
in the particular case when ∇v(r, t) = 0, that is the velocity field describes an “incompressible”
flow. It must be emphasized however that the two equations have different contents. Concep-
tually, the equation of persistence is about the quantities tracking the object in question. Such a
quantity is not necessarily a density-like quantity, in the sense that its volume integral is not nec-
essarily a meaningful physical quantity, especially not a conserved one. Moreover, the equation of
persistence and the continuity equation are independent: for a given set of quantities, one equa-
tion may hold without the other. The coarse-grained density of the spreading gas we will discuss
in section 5 is an example where the continuity equation holds but not the equation of persistence.
In contrast, the whiteness and blackness of an inflating spotted ball (Fig. 4) are quantities that sat-
isfy the equation of persistence but not the continuity equation (the velocity field describing an
inflating object is not divergence free).
3In the present analysis we restrict ourselves to classical (Galileo covariant) and special rela-
tivistic physics, and set aside the possible generalization for general relativity.
4For example, consider
{
t, x, y, z, Ex , Ey, Ez, Bx , By, Bz
}
where Ex , Ey, Ez and Bx , By, Bz are the
It is a universal principle of contemporary physics that all natural laws
are covariant; which means that the physical equations preserve their forms
against the transformation Λ.5 Accordingly, the equation of persistence must
be covariant. As the following considerations show, this requirement is auto-
matically satisfied, given that the set of tracking quantities f1, f2, ..., fn is closed
against the transformation law.
Indeed, the notion of persistence we arrived at is independent of the choice
of the reference frame, and in fact it is fully compatible with the princi-
ple of covariance. One way to see this is the following. Let A and B de-
note those points of spacetime whose coordinates in frame K are (r, t) and
(ϕt,t+δt (r) , t + δt), respectively. Equation (5) says that at points A and B each
quantity fi takes the same value. Assume that the transformation of quan-
tities in package f1, f2, ..., fn is closed against the transformation law, that is
the values of f1, f2, ..., fn together (taken at a given spacetime point) uniquely
determine the values of the corresponding quantities f ′1, f
′
2, ..., f
′
n in another in-
ertial frame K′ (at the same spacetime point). Due to the fact that the trans-
formation law is a one-to-one map, the f ′i -s will also take the same values in
spacetime points A and B, given that the fi -s do so. This in turn is nothing but
saying that equation (5) also holds in inertial frame K′—with a suitable map
ϕ′t′ ,t′+δt′ : Σ
′
t′ → Σ′t′+δt′ , where Σ′t′ and Σ′t′+δt′ are the spatial regions occupied
by the object in question at time t′ and t′ + δt′ in frame K′.
In order to show another way of demonstrating that the equations of persis-
tence (6) are covariant we focus on the most important particular case: special
relativistic physics. Applying the basic notions of Minkowski spacetime, we
can rewrite (6) in terms of four-velocity and four-gradient:
Vα∂α fi = 0 (7)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Assume again that the transformation of quantities f1, f2, ..., fn is closed against
Lorentz transformation, that is
f ′i =
n
∑
j=1
Lij f j (8)
with suitable coefficients Lij. (Here we assume, as it is usually the case, that the
Lorentz transformation is linear.) Then, for the primed expression V′α∂′α f ′i one
receives
V′α∂′α f ′i = V
′
α∂
′α
(
n
∑
j=1
Lij f j
)
=
n
∑
j=1
Lij
(
Vα∂α f j
)
= 0 (9)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
where we used the invariance of the Minkowksi scalar product and (7). This
means that the equations of persistence also hold in frame K′, given that they
electric and magnetic field strengths in K. Now, for example,
{
Ex , Ey, Ez
}
is not closed
against the Lorentz transformation, while subset
{
Ex , Ey, Ez, Bx , By, Bz
}
is closed; the values of
Ex , Ey, Ez, Bx , By, Bz in K uniquely determine the values of E′x , E′y, E′z, B′x , B′y, B′z. Similarly, {t, x, y, z}
is a closed subset, while {x, y, z} is not.
5For a more precise formulation see Gömöri–Szabó 2015.
do so in K; that is, they are covariant. Further, assuming that the transforma-
tions of the fi-s are such that they can be identified with components of suitable
four-tensors, one can cast the equations of persistence in a manifestly covariant
form. For example, the equations of persistence (24)–(25) written down for the
electromagnetic field in the next section have the covariant form
Vα∂αFβγ = 0 (10)
(β,γ = 0, 1, 2, 3)
where Fβγ is the Faraday tensor.
Thus, the upshot of the above analysis is that persistence admits a covariant
formulation iff the tracking quantities f1, f2, ..., fn constitute a closed set against the
transformation laws. With this result in mind in what follows we shall continue
to use the 3+1 notation.
4 The Case of a General Electrodynamic System
As a concrete physical example, we will deal with electromagnetic field. Ac-
cording to the standard realistic interpretation of classical electrodynamics,
“the interaction between charged particles are mediated by the electromag-
netic field, which is ontologically on a par with charged particles and the state
of which is given by the values of the field strengths” (Frisch 2005, p. 28). Thus,
electromagnetic field is conceived as a real extended physical substance pos-
sessing two intrinsic physical properties, the field strengths E and B, in every
space point at every moment of time.
We will consider the electromagnetic field as a part of a coupled system of
charged particles and the field; described by the Maxwell–Lorentz equations
(for this form of the equations, see for example Gömöri and Szabó 2013):
∇ · E (r, t) =
n
∑
i=1
qiδ
(
r− ri (t)
)
(11)
c2∇× B (r, t)− ∂tE (r, t) =
n
∑
i=1
qiδ
(
r− ri (t)
)
vi (t) (12)
∇ · B (r, t) = 0 (13)
∇× E (r, t) + ∂tB (r, t) = 0 (14)
miγ
(
vi (t)
)
ai(t) = qi
{
E
(
ri (t) , t
)
+ vi (t)× B
(
ri (t) , t
)
−c−2vi (t)
(
vi (t) ·E
(
ri (t) , t
))}
(15)
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
where, γ(. . .) =
(
1− (...)2c2
)− 12
, qi is the electric charge and mi is the rest mass
of the i-th particle.
If electromagnetic field is conceived as a persisting physical entity, some of
its intrinsic properties, as tracking properties, have to satisfy the equation of
persistence. Now, E and B are fundamental, in the sense that all other known
physical properties of the field (energy, momentum, etc.) supervene on E and
B. Moreover, E and B together constitute a closed set of quantities against the
Lorentz transformation. So, the natural expectation is that the six field strength
components Ex, Ey, Ez, Bx, By, Bz constitute a package of tracking quantities;
and, therefore, they satisfy equation (6), in addition to the Maxwell–Lorentz
equations (11)–(15).
Let us first investigate an example where this works well: the static and
uniformly moving ‘charged particle + the coupled electromagnetic field’ sys-
tem. Consider the static solution when the charge q is at rest at point (x0, y0, z0)
in a given inertial frame of reference K:
Ex(t, x, y, z) =
q (x− x0)(
(x− x0)2 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Ey(t, x, y, z) =
q (y− y0)(
(x− x0)2 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Ez(t, x, y, z) =
q (z− z0)(
(x− x0)2 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Bx(t, x, y, z) = 0
By(t, x, y, z) = 0
Bz(t, x, y, z) = 0
(16)
The stationary field of a charge q moving at constant velocity V = (V, 0, 0)
relative to K can be obtained (Jackson 1999, pp. 661–665) by solving the equa-
tions of electrodynamics with the time-depending source. The solution is the
following:
Ex(t, x, y, z) =
qX0(
X20 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Ey(t, x, y, z) =
γq (y− y0)(
X20 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Ez(t, x, y, z) =
γq (z− z0)(
X20 + (y− y0)2 + (z− z0)2
)3/2
Bx(t, x, y, z) = 0
By(t, x, y, z) = −c−2VEz(t, x, y, z)
Bz(t, x, y, z) = c−2VEy(t, x, y, z)
(17)
where (x0, y0, z0) is the initial position of the particle at t = 0, X0 =
γ (x− (x0 + Vt)) and γ =
(
1− V2c2
)− 12 .
Now, it is easy to verify that both the static solution (16) and the stationary
solution (17) satisfy the equations of persistence (6) with constant and homo-
geneous velocity field V = (0, 0, 0) and V = (V, 0, 0),6 respectively, in the
6It must be pointed out that velocity V conceptually differs from the speed of light c. Basically, c
Figure 5: The stationary field of a uniformly moving point charge is in collective
motion together with the point charge
following sense:7
−∂tE(r, t) = DE(r, t)V (18)
−∂tB(r, t) = DB(r, t)V (19)
Or, in the form of (5),
E(r, t) = E(r−Vδt, t− δt) (20)
B(r, t) = B(r−Vδt, t− δt) (21)
Thus, in this particular example the necessary conditions of the persistence
of the electromagnetic field are clearly satisfied.
But, this example obviously represents a special electrodynamic configura-
is a constant of nature in the Maxwell–Lorentz equations, which can emerge in the solutions of the
equations; and, in some cases, it can be interpreted as the velocity of propagation of changes in the
electromagnetic field. For example, in our case, the stationary field of a uniformly moving point
charge, in collective motion with velocity V, can be constructed from the superposition of retarded
potentials, in which the retardation is calculated with velocity c. Nevertheless, the two velocities
are different concepts. To illustrate the difference, consider the fields of a charge at rest (16), and in
motion (17). The speed of light c plays the same role in both cases. Both fields can be constructed
from the superposition of retarded potentials in which the retardation is calculated with velocity
c. Also, in both cases, a small local perturbation in the field configuration would propagate with
velocity c. But still there is a consensus to say that the system described by (16) is at rest while
the one described by (17) is moving with velocity V (relative to K.) A good analogy would be a
Lorentz contracted moving rod: V is the velocity of the rod, which differs from the speed of sound
in the rod.
7In DE(r, t) and DB(r, t), D denotes the spatial derivative operator (Jacobian for variables x, y
and z). That is, in components we have:
−∂tEx(r, t) = Vx∂xEx(r, t) + Vy∂yEx(r, t) + Vz∂zEx(r, t)
−∂tEy(r, t) = Vx∂xEy(r, t) + Vy∂yEy(r, t) + Vz∂zEy(r, t)
...
−∂tBz(r, t) = Vx∂x Bz(r, t) + Vy∂yBz(r, t) + Vz∂zBz(r, t)
−∂t$(r, t) = Vx∂x$(r, t) + Vy∂y$(r, t) + Vz∂z$(r, t)
tion. Indeed, equations (18)–(19) imply that
E(r, t) = E0(r−Vt) (22)
B(r, t) = B0(r−Vt) (23)
with some time-independent E0(r) and B0(r). In other words, the field must
be a stationary one, that is, a translation of a static field with velocity V. In fact,
this corresponds to the very special “rigid” way of persistence we described
in point II of the previous section. But, (22)–(23) is certainly not the case for a
general solution of the equations of classical electrodynamics. The behavior of
the field can be much more complex. Whatever this complex behavior is, one
might hope that it satisfies the general form of persistence described in point
III; that is, the equations of persistence are satisfied with a more general local
and instantaneous velocity field v(r, t):
−∂tE(r, t) = DE(r, t)v(r, t) (24)
−∂tB(r, t) = DB(r, t)v(r, t) (25)
In other words, if electromagnetic field is a real persisting physical
entity, existing in space and time, then for all possible solutions of the
Maxwell–Lorentz equations (11)–(15) there must exist, at least, a local instanta-
neous velocity field v(r, t) satisfying (24)–(25). That is, substituting an arbitrary
solution8 of (11)–(15) into (24)–(25), the overdetermined system of equations
must have a solution for v(r, t).
One encounters however the following difficulty:
Theorem 1. There exists a solution of the coupled Maxwell–Lorentz equations
(11)–(15) for which there cannot exist a local instantaneous velocity field v(r, t) satis-
fying the persistence equations (24)–(25).
Proof. As a proof, we give a surprisingly simple example. Consider the electric
field in a parallel-plate capacitor being charged up by a constant current. The
electric field strength is:
E(r, t) = E0t (26)
where E0 is a constant vector determined by the current and the properties of
the capacitor (Fig. 6). It is easy to check that there is no space-time point (r, t)
where E(r, t) would satisfy the equation of persistence (24) with some velocity
v(r, t).
One might think that this is an exceptional case, due to the idealization
of the real physical situation. But, as the next theorem shows, this is not so
exceptional.
8Without entering into the details, it must be noted that the Maxwell–Lorentz equations
(11)–(15), exactly in this form, have no solution. The reason is that the field is singular at pre-
cisely the points where the coupling happens: on the trajectories of the particles. The generally
accepted answer to this problem is that the real source densities are some “smoothed out” Dirac
deltas, determined by the physical laws of the internal worlds of the particles—which are, sup-
posedly, outside of the scope of classical electrodynamics. With this explanation, for the sake of
simplicity we leave the Dirac deltas in the equations. Since our considerations here focus on the
electromagnetic field, satisfying the four Maxwell equations, we only have to assume that there is
a coupled dynamics—approximately described by equations (11)–(15)—and that it constitutes an
initial value problem. In fact, Theorem 2 could be stated in a weaker form, by leaving the concrete
form and dynamics of the source densities unspecified.
Figure 6: Linearly increasing electric field strengths in a parallel-plate capacitor
charged up by a constant current
Theorem 2. There is a dense subset of solutions of the coupled Maxwell–Lorentz
equations (11)–(15) for which there cannot exist a local instantaneous velocity field
v(r, t) satisfying the persistence equations (24)–(25).
Proof. The proof is almost trivial for a locus (r, t) where there is a charged point
particle. However, in order to avoid the eventual difficulties concerning the
physical interpretation, we are providing a proof for a point (r∗, t∗) where there
is assumed no source at all.
Consider a solution
(
r1 (t) , r2 (t) , . . . , rn (t) ,E(r, t),B(r, t)
)
of the coupled
Maxwell–Lorentz equations (11)–(15), which satisfies (24)–(25). At point
(r∗, t∗), the following equations hold:
−∂tE(r∗, t∗) = DE(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (27)
−∂tB(r∗, t∗) = DB(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (28)
∂tE(r∗, t∗) = c2∇× B(r∗, t∗) (29)
−∂tB(r∗, t∗) = ∇× E(r∗, t∗) (30)
∇ · E(r∗, t∗) = 0 (31)
∇ · B(r∗, t∗) = 0 (32)
Without loss of generality we can assume—at point r∗ and time t∗—that oper-
ators DE(r∗, t∗) and DB(r∗, t∗) are invertible and vz(r∗, t∗) 6= 0.
Now, consider a 3× 3 matrix J such that
J =
 ∂xEx(r∗, t∗) Jxy Jxz∂xEy(r∗, t∗) ∂yEy(r∗, t∗) ∂zEy(r∗, t∗)
∂xEz(r∗, t∗) ∂yEz(r∗, t∗) ∂zEz(r∗, t∗)
 (33)
with
Jxy = ∂yEx(r∗, t∗) + λ (34)
Jxz = ∂zEx(r∗, t∗)− λvy(r∗, t∗)vz(r∗, t∗) (35)
by virtue of which
Jxyvy(r∗, t∗) + Jxzvz(r∗, t∗) = vy(r∗, t∗)∂yEx(r∗, t∗)
+vz(r∗, t∗)∂zEx(r∗, t∗) (36)
Therefore, Jv(r∗, t∗) = DE(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗). There always exists a vector field
E#λ(r) such that its Jacobian matrix at point r∗ is equal to J. Obviously,
from (31) and (33), ∇ · E#λ(r∗) = 0. Therefore, there exists a solution of the
Maxwell–Lorentz equations, such that the electric and magnetic fields Eλ(r, t)
and Bλ(r, t) satisfy the following conditions:9
Eλ(r, t∗) = E#λ(r) (37)
Bλ(r, t∗) = B(r, t∗) (38)
At (r∗, t∗), such a solution obviously satisfies the following equations:
∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = c2∇× B(r∗, t∗) (39)
−∂tBλ(r∗, t∗) = ∇× E#λ(r∗) (40)
therefore
∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = ∂tE(r∗, t∗) (41)
As a little reflection shows, if DE#λ(r∗), that is J, happened to be not invert-
ible, then one can choose a smaller λ such that DE#λ(r∗) becomes invertible (due
to the fact that DE(r∗, t∗) is invertible), and, at the same time,
∇× E#λ(r∗) 6= ∇× E(r∗, t∗) (42)
Consequently, from (41) , (35) and (27) we have
−∂tEλ(r∗, t∗) = DEλ(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) = DE#λ(r∗)v(r∗, t∗) (43)
and v(r∗, t∗) is uniquely determined by this equation. On the other hand, from
(40) and (42) we have
−∂tBλ(r∗, t∗) 6= DBλ(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) = DB(r∗, t∗)v(r∗, t∗) (44)
because DB(r∗, t∗) is invertible, too. That is, for Eλ(r, t) and Bλ(r, t) there is no
local and instantaneous velocity at point r∗ and time t∗.
At the same time, λ can be arbitrary small, and
lim
λ→0
Eλ(r, t) = E(r, t) (45)
lim
λ→0
Bλ(r, t) = B(r, t) (46)
Therefore solution
(
r1λ (t) , r
2
λ (t) , . . . , r
n
λ (t) ,Eλ(r, t),Bλ(r, t)
)
can fall into an
arbitrary small neighborhood of
(
r1 (t) , r2 (t) , . . . , rn (t) ,E(r, t),B(r, t)
)
.10
9E#λ(r) and Bλ(r, t∗) can be regarded as the initial configurations at time t∗; we do not need to
specify a particular choice of initial values for the sources.
10Notice that our investigation has been concerned with the general laws of Maxwell–Lorentz
electrodynamics of a coupled particles + electromagnetic field system. The proof was essentially
based on the presumption that all solutions of the Maxwell–Lorentz equations, determined by any
initial state of the particles + electromagnetic field system, corresponded to physically possible
configurations of the electromagnetic field. It is sometimes claimed, however, that the solutions
must be restricted by the so called retardation condition, according to which all physically ad-
missible field configurations must be generated from the retarded potentials belonging to some
pre-histories of the charged particles (Jánossy 1971, p. 171; Frisch 2005, p. 145). There is no obvi-
ous answer to the question of how Theorem 2 is altered under such additional condition.
5 Ontology of Classical Electrodynamics
The consequence of this result is embarrassing: the two fundamental electro-
dynamic quantities, the field strengths E(r, t) and B(r, t), do not satisfy the
equations of persistence (6). Therefore, the electromagnetic field tracked by
the field strengths cannot be regarded as a persisting physical object; in other
words, electromagnetic field—for example, the field within the capacitor in
Fig. 6—cannot be regarded as being a real physical entity existing in space and
time. This seems to contradict the usual realistic interpretation of classical elec-
trodynamics.
So, there are three options.
(i) One can abandon the realist understanding of electrodynamics:
There is no such a persisting physical entity as “electromagnetic
field”.
(ii) Although, we think, in point III we formulated the most general
form of how an extended physical object can persist, one may try
to imagine a more sophisticated way of persistence.11
(iii) Electromagnetic field is a real physical entity, persisting in the sense
we formulated persistence in point III, but it cannot be tracked
by the field strengths E(r, t) and B(r, t). That is, there must exist
some quantities other than the field strengths, perhaps outside of
the scope of classical electrodynamics, tracking the electromagnetic
field. This suggests that classical electrodynamics is an ontologi-
cally incomplete theory.
How to conceive properties, different from the field strengths, which are ca-
pable of tracking the electromagnetic field? One might think of them as some
“finer”, more fundamental, properties of the field, not only tracking it as a per-
sisting extended object, but also determining the values of the field strengths.
However, the following easily verifiable theorem shows that this determina-
tion cannot be so simple:
11In point III the equations of persistence were based on the metaphysical intuition that an ex-
tended object can be conceived as the mereological sum of its local parts, each of which itself being
a persisting entity. One might object that in case of the electromagnetic field this intuition is not
justified: the electromagnetic field should rather be seen as one single indivisible entity spread-
ing over the whole of space, whose persistence simply means that the field, as a whole, is present
at all instants of time. This fact then might be translated as the condition that the field strengths
take some values in all spatiotemporal regions, which is clearly respected by all solutions of the
Maxwell–Lorentz equations.
We believe nonetheless that this is not the way we usually think about the electromagnetic field,
and in fact one has good physical grounds to talk about the local parts of the field as entities
themselves. We make three observations: 1) In electrodynamics we attribute properties to the local
parts of the electromagnetic field—the parts of the field occupying certain spatial regions—that
we attribute to entities in other cases. Such properties, for example, are energy and momentum.
2) Part of the reason why one believes that the electromagnetic field is a real physical entity is that
it makes manifest the idea of local action—that of the continuous propagation of physical actions in
space and time. The idea of local action makes no sense unless there exists a local entity, the local
part of the field, that mediates the physical action. 3) Another aspect of locality in electrodynamics
is that the state of the electromagnetic field given on a segment of Cauchy surface determines the
state of the field in the future dependence domain of the surface in question. Clearly, this idea
requires that we must be able to assign local states of the electromagnetic field to spatiotemporal
regions (to the surface and domain of dependence in question). Such an assignment only makes
sense if there exists something, a local entity, that is capable of being in those local states.
Figure 7: A puff of gas is sprayed into an empty room through a little pipe
Theorem 3. Let f1, f2, ..., fn be a package of quantities for which there exists a local
instantaneous velocity field v(r, t) satisfying the equations of persistence (6) in a given
space-time region. If a quantity Φ is a functional of the quantities f1, f2, . . . , fn in the
following form:
Φ(r, t) = Φ ( f1(r, t), f2(r, t), ..., fn(r, t))
then Φ also obeys the equation of persistence
−∂tΦ(r, t) = ∇Φ(r, t)v(r, t)
with the same local instantaneous velocity field v(r, t), within the same space-time
region.
Therefore, E(r, t) and B(r, t) cannot supervene pointwise upon some more
fundamental tracking quantities satisfying the persistence equations. How-
ever, they might supervene in some non-local sense. For example, imagine that
E(r, t) and B(r, t) provide only a course-grained characterization of the field,
but there exist some more fundamental fields E˜(r, t) and B˜(r, t), such that
E(r, t) =
ˆ
Ωr
E˜ (rˆ, t) d3(rˆ) (47)
B(r, t) =
ˆ
Ωr
B˜ (rˆ, t) d3(rˆ) (48)
where Ωr is a neighborhood of r. In this case, the more fundamental quantities
E˜(r, t) and B˜(r, t) may satisfy the equations of persistence, while E(r, t) and
B(r, t), supervening on E˜(r, t) and B˜(r, t), may not.
It is worthwhile to mention that one has very similar situation in the case
of continuum mechanics. Consider the following simple example. A puff of
gas is sprayed into an empty room through a little pipe (Fig. 7). As the gas
is spreading, the density of the gas $(x, t) is continuously decreasing in every
point of the instantaneous region occupied by the gas (Fig. 8). Consequently,
$(x, t) does not satisfy the equation of persistence. This means that the density
distribution, which is one of the basic quantities of the continuum mechanical
description of the gas, cannot be in the package of intrinsic properties tracking
the gas.
In contrast, assuming that the gas consists of a huge number of small rigid
particles, the fine-grained density distribution $˜(x, t) looks like as depicted in
Fig. 8 and satisfies the equation of persistence (6) with a suitable local and
instantaneous velocity field, the value of which at every point in a region oc-
cupied by a particle is equal to the instantaneous velocity of the particle con-
cerned. The course-grained density supervenes on the fine-grained density;
Figure 8: The density of the gas $(x, t) is continuously decreasing in every point of
the region Σt occupied by the gas. Consequently, $(x, t) does not satisfy the equation
of persistence. In contrast, the fine-grained density distribution $˜(x, t), reflecting the
molecular structure of the gas, does satisfy the equation of persistence
not pointwise, but in the style of (47)–(48):
$(r, t) =
1
Ω
ˆ
Ωr
$˜(rˆ, t)d3(rˆ)
where Ωr denotes a sphere of volume Ω with center r, large enough relative
to the fine-grained structure, but small enough to have a meaningful smooth
approximation.
It is worth noting that while continuum mechanics alone is thus incapable
of accounting for the persistence of the gas, the continuum mechanical descrip-
tion itself also tacitly assumes that the gas constitutes a persisting entity. The
reason is that the continuum mechanical description refers to a velocity field,
as one of its fundamental quantities. For example, the coarse-grained density
$(x, t) of the spreading gas obeys a continuity equation
∂t$(r, t) +∇ ($(r, t)v(r, t)) = 0
expressing that the quantity of the gas remains constant upon spreading out.
Here $(r, t)v(r, t) is the convection current density attached to the local mo-
tion of the gas at space-time point (r, t). Now whose velocity is v(r, t)? One
might think that within continuum mechanics v(r, t) can be interpreted as
the velocity of the local part of a persisting continuum located at r at time t.
However, continuum mechanics itself fails to support such an interpretation:
the coarse-grained quantities featuring the continuum mechanical description,
among them $(x, t), fail to satisfy the equations of persistence, as the example
of the spreading gas demonstrates, and hence v(r, t) is not definable in terms
of the properties of the continuum described by continuum mechanics. It is
thus no surprise that this is not the way the fundamental field v(r, t) is finally
explicated (cf. Truesdell and Toupin p. 227 vs. p. 327). Instead, v(r, t) is expli-
cated by going beyond the domain of the continuum mechanical description,
in terms of the molecular structure of the gas: v(r, t) is defined on the basis of
the velocities of the particles of the gas, located around r at time t, by means of
some averaging procedures (see Murdoch 2012, Section 3.6).
The upshot of all this is that the continuum mechanical description of
the gas in terms of the course-grained quantities is ontologically incomplete.
This incomplete description can be completed by appealing to the fine-grained
structure of the gas (cf. Murdoch 2012, Chapter 3; Batterman 2006). The per-
plexing question is: what could be a similar fine-grained structure of a classical
electromagnetic field?
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